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Gurus and beliefs manipulation
Abstract
We analyze a model with two types of agents: standard agents and gurus, i.e. agents
who have the ability to inuence the other investors. Gurus announce their beliefs and act
accordingly. Each investor has a preferred guru and follows his recommendations. Prices are
determined through a classical Walras mechanism. Gurus are strategic: they take into account
the impact of their announced beliefs on the other agents, hence on prices. At the Nash
equilibrium, this leads to beliefs heterogeneity, to a positive correlation between optimism and
risk aversion and to higher risk premia. The impact is stronger on the riskier assets.
2
1 Introduction
In the classical nancial economics theory, decision makers are assumed to have homogenous and
rational expectations. This assumption has been the basis for many developments in nance.
Among these developments, the portfolio selection model (Markowitz, 1952) and the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM, Sharpe 1964 and Lintner 1965) play an important role. Given their
simplicity and empirical tractability, these models and their subsequent extensions have become
a signicant cornerstone of theoretical and applied economics from insurance and nancial
theory to the theory of the rm.
However, the last 30 years have seen an accumulation of empirical tests that invalidate the
theoretical conclusions of these models based on the assumption of homogeneous and objec-
tive beliefs. Furthermore, it su¢ ces to observe the heterogeneity of analysts or professional
forecasters forecasts or more generally of experts opinions to realize that this assumption is
not realistic. In this paper, our aim is to analyze to what extent this heterogeneity may be
generated by the presence of gurus that act strategically. We consider a model with two types
of agents: "standard" investors and gurus (inuential investors, newsletters writers,...). Like in
Benabou-Laroque (2001), the "guru" we have in mind issues forecasts but is also in the busi-
ness of trading, for his own account or some investment rm. In our model, gurus announce
their beliefs and each investor adopts the announced belief of one guru. This corresponds to
the ndings of Fisher-Statman (2000) where it appears that there is a positive relationship
between changes in the sentiment of individual investors and that of newsletter writers. The
gurus choose their "beliefs" strategically taking into account the impact of their announced
beliefs on other agents hence on prices.
The following example quoted by Benabou-Laroque (1992) provides the most dramatic
illustration of prices reacting to someones announcement.
In the nervous market of 1987, Mr Prechter has emerged as both prophet and deity,
an adviser whose advice reaches so many investors that he tends to pull the market
the way he has predicted it will move [International Herald Tribune, October 3,
1987]
For credibility reasons gurus act according to their announced beliefs. These strategic beliefs
are not true beliefs from the gurus point of view, however they correspond to what the investors
truly believe, moreover they are interpreted as gurusbeliefs by econometricians who observe
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portfolio choices.
We tackle the following issues. Do gurus have incentives to announce beliefs other than their
true beliefs? How are investorsbeliefs a¤ected by the strategic interaction between gurus? Do
the resulting beliefs exhibit optimism? pessimism? How are these possible biases related to the
agents preferences? What is the impact of these beliefs on individual decisions? What is the
impact of these beliefs on equilibrium characteristics such as prices and risk premium?
Our ndings are the following. A strategic behavior leads to beliefs subjectivity and het-
erogeneity among the gurus even when gurusinitial beliefs coincide with the objective belief.
Optimism as well as pessimism can both emerge. The intuition is as follows. Consider a model
with two gurus. For the more risk tolerant guru, his demand in the risky asset is positive, so
that his expected utility from trade is decreasing in the price of the risky asset. The choice of
a pessimistic belief is associated with a lower demand, hence to a lower price, and the optimal
belief balances this benet of pessimism against the costs of worse decision making. The con-
verse reasoning applies to the risk averse guru, who, at the equilibrium, has a negative demand
in the risky asset and benets from optimism. Depending on their levels of risk aversion, the
agents adopt the beliefs of one of the gurus and we nd a positive correlation across the agents
between pessimism and risk tolerance.
Second, the representative agent belief, or the consensus belief, which is given by the average
of the individual beliefs weighted by the risk tolerance, is pessimistic. Intuitively, the more risk
tolerant agents make the market, and the consensus belief reects the characteristics of the
more risk tolerant. Since we have just seen that the more risk tolerant are pessimistic, it is
consistent to obtain a pessimistic consensus belief. Such a pessimistic bias is also obtained
in empirical studies in a purely behavioral setting (Ben Mansour et al., 2006), in a decision
theory framework (Wakker, 2001) or in a market framework (Giordani-Söderlind, 2006). In
particular, as underlined by Shefrin (2005) based on Wall $treet Week data between 1983 and
2002, professional investors were unduly pessimistic, underestimating market returns.
As a consequence of the pessimistic bias at the aggregate level, the risk premium is greater
than in the standard rational expectations equilibrium. The fact that a pessimistic bias and
a positive correlation between risk tolerance and pessimism lead to an increase of the market
price of risk has been underlined by Abel (1989), Calvet et al. (2002), Detemple-Murthy (1994),
Gollier (2007) and Jouini-Napp (2006); in their models, beliefs are exogenously given. This
increase of the risk premium is interesting in light of the risk-premium puzzle on nancial
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markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main model and the results.
Section 3 provides three main extensions (considering private information, more than 2 assets,
more than 2 gurus). Section 4 concludes. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2 The model and the results
We consider a model with a continuum of agents. Among these agents, there are 2 inuential
investors who have a wide audience. We do not assume that they have the capacity to move the
markets by their own trades but only that they have, through their wide audience, the ability
to largely inuence the other investors. We will call them gurus and denote them by Guru j;
j = 1; 2:
Gurus announce their beliefs and act accordingly in order to maintain their credibility. The
announced beliefs are based on strategic considerations1.
The other agents in the economy believe that gurus are well informed or have specic ability
to predict market movements. At a given date each agent has a preferred guru and adopts his
beliefs. There are then 2 groups of agents: the agents in Group j (Gj) follow Guru j, j = 1; 2:
2.1 The gurusgame
We focus on a single period and consumption takes place at the end of the period. There is a
single risky asset in the economy, whose payo¤ at the end of the period is denoted by ex: We
let p denote the unit price of the risky asset, which means that agents can sell their property
rights on the risky asset against the delivery of the sure quantity p at the end of the period.
We assume that there is one unit of the risky asset in the economy and that it is uniformly
distributed among the agents. As in the standard portfolio problem, agents determine the
optimal composition of their portfolio, in other words their optimal exposure to the risk. The
di¤erence with the standard model stems from the fact that agents adopt the beliefs of one
of the two gurus and that the gurus take into account their impact as well as the impact of
their followers on prices and can manipulate their beliefs to take advantage of this impact. For
example, a guru, who is risk tolerant, hence willing to be quite highly exposed to the risk, or
equivalently interested in buying a high quantity of the risky asset, could announce a more
1We shall see in Section 3 that the announced beliefs may also be based on private information.
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pessimistic belief and act as if he believed that the asset was less interesting (or as if he were
less interested in buying the asset) in order to benet from a lower price.
We assume that agents have CARA utility functions for consumption, more precisely,
ui (c) =   exp

  ci

where i > 0 denotes the degree of risk tolerance of agent i for i 2 [0; 1]
and where i ! i is measurable. We denote by 1 =
R
G1
idi and by 2 =
R
G2
idi the ag-
gregate risk tolerance in G1 and G2. We have 1 + 2 =  where  is the aggregate risk
tolerance in the economy2. Moreover, we assume that ex is normally distributed, with mean 
and variance 2.
We assume that the gurus also have CARA utility functions, uj (c) =   exp

  cj

where
j > 0 denotes the degree of risk tolerance of Guru j for j = 1; 2. Both gurus observe : However,
Guru j announces a belief j and this belief is adopted by all the agents in Gj : The belief j is
then chosen strategically. For credibility reasons, gurus act according to their announced beliefs.
A possible justication for such a behavior is that agents can observe gurusportfolios and may
eliminate a guru whose portfolio choices are not consistent with his announced forecasts.
As already noticed, the announced belief is not a true belief for the guru but it will be
considered as such by an observer/econometrician who analyzes gurus portfolio choices. It is
also a true belief for the other agents since they sincerely trust one of the gurus and adopt his
announced belief as their own true belief.
For given announced beliefs (1; 2); the optimal demand i(p) of the risky asset that agent
i will retain given price p maximizes the expected utility from trade
Ei

  exp p+ i (ex  p)
i

where Ei corresponds to the expectation operator associated to agent i belief. If agent i adopts
the belief of Guru j then the optimal demand is given by i (p) = i
j p
2
: The total demand of
Group j is given by
Gj (p) = j
j   p
2
;
and corresponds to the demand of a representative agent for Group j with belief j and risk
tolerance j : As underlined, all the agents, including the Gurus, are innitesimal and the
2A model with a continuum of agents permits to approximate models with a large number of agents. Further-
more, all pairs (1;2) with 1 + 2 =  are possible in such a model. The analysis would be essentially the
same in a model with a nite number of agents except that we should choose the 0is on a grid.
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individual demands also are innitesimal. For a given price, the total demand of risky asset in
the economy is then the sum of the total demands of Group 1 and of Group 2. The equilibrium
price p(1; 2) is then determined by the condition
1
1   p
2
+2
2   p
2
= 1; (1)
and given by
p(1; 2) =
11 +22

  
2

: (2)
Moreover, replacing p by its expression in Gj (p) we obtain that the aggregate optimal demand
at the equilibrium for Group 1 (Group 2) are given by
G1 =
1


1 + 2
1   2
2

G2 =
2


1 + 1
2   1
2

and the part of the risk borne by Group j depends upon both his level of risk tolerance and his
belief: Letting RP (resp. RP stdd ) denote the risk premium    p in this setting (resp. in the
standard setting where all beliefs coincide with the objective belief ) we obtain
RP (1; 2;1;2) =
2

+

  11 +22


= RP stdd +

  11 +22


(3)
which means that the risk premium in an economy with heterogeneous subjective beliefs is higher
than in the standard rational expectations setting if and only if the belief of the representative
agent, which is the risk tolerance weighted average of the individual beliefs, is pessimistic, where
pessimistic is meant in the sense that the mean of the risky assets payo¤ is underestimated. In
such a setting, it is particularly interesting to explore when and why the representative agent
is pessimistic. In the present paper, the individual beliefs result from the gurus beliefs which
are determined endogenously. We shall then analyze their properties, especially in terms of
pessimism, correlation between pessimism and risk tolerance and impact on the risk premium.
The demand of Guru j is determined, as usual, by his own level of risk tolerance j and by
his announced belief j : Recall that gurus act according to their announced beliefs in order to
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maintain their credibility. The demand of Guru j is given by
j (p; j) = 

j
j   p
2
: (4)
The utility level of Guru j is given by
Uj(1; 2) = E

uj
 
p(1; 2) + (~x  p(1; 2))j (p(1; 2); j)

= E

  exp

  1
j
 
p(1; 2) + (~x  p(1; 2))j (p(1; 2); j)

:
Guru j acts strategically and chooses bj that maximizes his utility level
Uj
 bi; j = E   exp  1j  p(bi; j) + (~x  p(bi; j))j (p(bi; j); j)

where bi denotes the strategy of Guru i and is taken as given. We emphasize that the choice
of the belief cj is strategic: the guru believes that the mean of ex is  but he behaves as if he
truly believed that it is cj in order to take advantage of his impact (through his inuence on
other agents beliefs) on prices and to maximize his utility from prots.
The gurus then play a game dened by payo¤ functions Uj ; j = 1; 2 and their strategic
variable is their belief j : The parameters of this game are (1;2) and we denote it by
  (1;2) :
Denition 1 An equilibrium with strategic beliefs manipulation is a Nash equilibrium of the
game   (1;2) ; i.e. a pair of strategies M = (b1 (1;2) ; b2 (1;2)) for the gurus such
that for any other pair of strategies M 0 di¤ering only in the j-th component, for j = 1; 2; the
strategy M yields a utility level no less than M 0 :
E

uj
 
p (M) + (ex  p (M))j (M)  E uj  p  M 0+  ex  p  M 0j  M 0 :
Note that the risk tolerance levels involved in the price formula (1) are not those of the
gurus but those of their respective groups. In particular, we may have 1 > 

2 with 1 < 2,
i.e. the more risk tolerant guru may have a lower weight in the price formula than the other
guru (or equivalently the risk tolerance level of his group is lower than the risk tolerance level
of the other group). The payo¤ function then involves two di¤erent levels of risk tolerance,
the individual level of risk tolerance of the guru under consideration through the form of the
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utility function and the level of risk tolerance of the group associated with that guru through
the price formula. Our game is then di¤erent from an imperfect competition game where each
agent would take into account his own direct impact on equilibrium prices in order to determine
his optimal strategy (as in e.g. Jouini et al., 2010).
Proposition 1 If the weight (or the risk tolerance level) of Group i is given by i; the model
admits a unique equilibrium with strategic beliefs manipulation, i.e. the game   (1;2) has a
unique Nash equilibrium (b1 (1;2) ; b2 (1;2)) with
b1 = + 12
 
122 + 

2
2
1 + 2

212   12

1

22
2; (5)
b2 = + 12
 
122 + 

2
2
1 + 2

112   12

1

21
2: (6)
2.2 The groupsdynamics
We have so far considered the parameters i =
R
Gi
idi, i = 1; 2; as given. Let us now analyze
how agents may choose their respective groups. We may imagine that the agents play several
times the same game with possibly di¤erent values for  at each step. After each step, the
agents observe market realizations and compare them with guruspredictions. They evaluate
the performance of each guru and their probability of choosing a given guru for the next step is
then related to the latters success3. More generally, the performance evaluation of each guru
by a given agent may be based on agents own experience with this guru. In particular, agents
may move from one guru to another based upon their initial priors, their own experience, their
past choices and the observed realizations. In such a setting the choice of a guru is an individual
decision and the switches from one guru to another do not necessarily occur at the same time
for all agents. We may also imagine that gurus are ranked by independent agencies on the basis
of the accuracy of their predictions and that the agents base their choice of a specic guru upon
these rankings.
Whatever the dynamics is, the steady states should respect the following natural condition
jbi (1;2)  j = bj (1;2)   that reects the fact that in the long run guruspredictions
should have the same level of accuracy. Let us denote by D = f(1;2) 2 R+  R+ : 1 +2 = g.
3As in Föllmer et al. (2004) the agents learn on gurusability and construct choice functions based on this
learning. There is a substantial literature on such adaptative learning rules which are associated with "discrete
choice" models; see e.g., Anderson et al. (1992). Di¤erent forms of these rules have been used and accounts are
given in Weisbuch et al. (1998) and Brock and Durlauf (2001a, 2001b).
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Denition An equilibrium for the groups dynamics is an element (1;2) of D such that
jb1 (1;2)  j = jb2 (1;2)  j : Such an equilibrium (1;2) is said to be stable if, in
a neighborhood of (1;2) ; we have jb1 (1;2)  j < jb2 (1;2)  j for 1 < 1 and
jb1 (1;2)  j > jb2 (1;2)  j for 1 > 1. It is said to be globally stable if this property
is satised on the whole domain D.
The stability concept introduced in the previous denition is fairly natural. When the size of
one of the two groups, let us say Group 1, is slightly modied towards an increase, the relative
accuracy of Guru 2 (resp. 1) increases leading to a migration of agents from Group 1 to Group
2.
Proposition 2 Let us assume that one guru is more risk tolerant than the average of the agents
while the other guru is less risk tolerant than the average, i.e. 1 >  > 

2: Then
1. There exists a unique equilibrium (1;2) for the groups dynamics. It is given as the
unique solution 1 of
31 (

1   2)  321 (1   2) + 21 (  2) = 0: (7)
2. The equilibrium (1;2) is globally stable.
3. At the equilibrium (1;2), the utility level of a given agent is not a¤ected by the choice
of a specic guru.
4. If the gurus are on average as risk tolerant as the whole population, i.e.  = 

1+

2
2 ; then
1 > 2, the representative agent belief is pessimistic, i.e.
1b1(1;2)+2b2(1;2)
 < ;
and the risk premium is increased, i.e. RP (b1 (1;2) ; b2 (1;2) ;1;2) > RP stdd:
5. If  = 

1+

2
2 and if the two groups have the same number of agents, i.e.
R
G1
di =
R
G2
di =
1
2 , then there is a positive correlation between pessimism and risk tolerance among the
whole population.
The rst assertion means that there is a unique distribution of risk tolerance among Group
1 and Group 2 for which the associated Nash equilibrium satises jb1   j = jb2   j leading
to the same level of accuracy for both gurus. The second assertion means that for any initial
distribution of risk tolerance among the two groups, any dynamics that favors the most accurate
guru converges to the distribution (1;2). The third assertion provides an additional stability
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result. Our initial stability concept is only based on the level of accuracy of guruspredictions.
However, even if agents take their utility level into account in the choice of their guru, they
will be indi¤erent between Guru 1 and Guru 2. The fourth assertion means that the more risk
tolerant group is the group of the more risk tolerant guru and also the most pessimistic one when
the gurus are on average as risk tolerant as the whole population. Since each group behaves like
a representative agent whose risk tolerance is given by the total risk tolerance within the group
it is natural to obtain that the more (less) risk tolerant group is in line with the more (less)
risk tolerant guru. This in turn implies that the representative agent is pessimistic and the risk
premium is increased. The condition introduced in 5. about the relative sizes of the groups is
natural. Indeed, when agents are indi¤erent between Guru 1 and Guru 2 from both accuracy
and utility point of views (as seen in 2. and 3.), there is no specic reason to choose one guru
rather than the other one. If agents choose each of the two gurus with a probability 12 , then
the two groups are of equal size, i.e.
R
G1
di =
R
G2
di = 12 . We then obtain a positive correlation
between pessimism and risk tolerance among the whole population as in Ben Mansour et al.
(2006).
To conclude and roughly speaking, at a steady state and if the two gurus are on average
as risk tolerant as the whole population, then the more risk tolerant guru is pessimistic, the
less risk tolerant guru is optimistic and there is a positive correlation between pessimism and
risk tolerance among the whole population. This implies that the strategic behavior leads to a
higher risk premium.
3 Extensions
3.1 The model with private information
In the previous section, we assumed that the gurus observe the objective belief. Let us consider
the situation where the two gurus have di¤erent initial beliefs: We assume that Guru i has an
initial belief i and distorts it strategically. As previously, he acts as if he had a belief bi that
is strategically determined by the maximization of the utility level
Ui
 
i;cj = Ei   exp  1j  p(i;cj) + (~x  p(i;cj))i (p(i;cj); i)

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where the equilibrium price p and Guru is demand i are given by Equations (2) and (4) and
where Ei is the expectation operator associated to the prior of Guru i: The gurus play then a
game dened by payo¤ functions Ui; i = 1; 2 and their strategic variable is their belief i: The
parameters of this game are (1;2; 1; 2) and we denote it by   (1;2; 1; 2) :
Proposition 3 If Guru i has an initial belief i and Group i has a weight (or a level of risk
tolerance) i then the model admits a unique equilibrium with strategic beliefs manipulation,
i.e. the game   (1;2; 1; 2) has a unique Nash equilibrium (b1; b2) with
c1 = 12 1212(1 + 2)  212+ 22212 + 212221 + 2122 + 2221122
c2 = 12 1212(1 + 2)  212+ 22112 + 212212 + 2122 + 2221121 ;
and the equilibrium price is given by
p(c1;c2) = 12 1212(1 + 2)1212   12 1
2
2 + 2
2
1  12
1212
2 (8)
When the di¤erent initial beliefs correspond to di¤erences of opinions, then there is no
relevant informational content in the equilibrium price. However, if the di¤erent initial beliefs
result from di¤erent signals received by the agents, then the equilibrium price transmits relevant
information and the right concept to use is the concept of rational expectations equilibrium.
Let us assume that the agents have the same initial prior ~x  N  ; 2 and that Guru i;
for i = 1; 2; observes a signal ~yi = ~x+ ~"i where ~"1 and ~"2 are independent and follow the same
distribution N  0; 2" : Guru is belief after the observation of a given realization yi is then
given by N  i; 2 with i = + (yi   ) 22"+2 and 2 = 22"2"+2 :
In such a model with private information a rational expectations equilibrium with strategic
beliefs manipulation is dened by a pair of announced beliefs (b1 (y1; y2) ; b2 (y1; y2)) and by
a price functional P (y1; y2) such that P (y1; y2) =
1b1(y1;y2)+2b2(y1;y2)
   
2
 (i.e. the markets
clear when Group 1 follows the announced belief of Guru 1 and Group 2 follows the announced
belief of Guru 2) and the belief bi (y1; y2) of Guru i maximizes his expected utility
Ui
 
i;cj = E   exp  1i  p(i;cj) + (~x  p(i;cj))i (p(i;cj); i)
 yi;P (y1; y2)
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where the price functional p(i; j) is dened by Equation
4 (2), where the belief of Guru j is
considered as given and where the expectation is conditional to the private information of Guru
i and to the public information conveyed by prices.
Following Equation (8), when the agents only take into account their private information,
the equilibrium price is given by
p(c1;c2) = 1212(+ (y   ) 22"+2 )1212   12 1
2
2 + 2
2
1  12
1212
2 (9)
where y = y1+y22 is the average signal.
The equilibrium price is then fully revealing and each agent is able to infer the average
signal from price observation. Since the average signal is a su¢ cient statistics of all the agents
available information, then the agents share the same belief about ~x after the observation of the
equilibrium price and it is given by N  ; 2 where  =  + (y   ) 21
2
2"+
2 and 
2 = 
22"
2"+2
2 :
Everything works as if both agents had observed a same signal y = y1+y22 which variance is given
by 
2
"
2 : As usual, it is easy to check that the fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium
corresponds to a standard equilibrium where the agents would share their information before
trading. All the information contained in the price is then already used by the agents when
they choose their strategic belief.
Proposition 4 If Guru i receives a private signal ~yi = ~x+~"i where ~"1 and ~"2 are independent
and follow the same distribution N  0; 2" and if Group i has a weight i then ((b1 (y1; y2) ; b2 (y1; y2) ; p (y1; y2))
dened by
b1 (y1; y2) = + (y1 + y22   ) 21
2
2
" + 
2
+
1
2
 
122 + 

2
2
1 + 2

212   12

1

22
22"
2" + 2
2
;
b2 (y1; y2) = + (y1 + y22   ) 21
2
2
" + 
2
+
1
2
 
122 + 

2
2
1 + 2

112   12

1

21
22"
2" + 2
2
;
p (y1; y2) =
1212(+ (
y1+y2
2   ) 
2
1
2
2"+
2 )
1212
  1
2
1
2
2 + 2
2
1  12
1212
22"
2" + 2
2
is a rational expectations equilibrium with strategic beliefs manipulations.
To sum up, when the agents beliefs result from the observation of signals that are correlated
with ~x; the resulting rational expectations equilibrium with strategic beliefs manipulation has
4Remark that, by construction, we have at the equilibrium P (y1; y2) = p(b1(y1; y2); b2(y1; y2)):
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the same characteristics as the equilibrium with strategic beliefs manipulation when the agents
have the same initial belief N  ; 2 :
On average over all possible signals, the average beliefs and price correspond to the equilib-
rium with strategic beliefs manipulation analyzed in the previous section when the distribution
of ~x is assumed to be N (; 2): Hence, modulo a modication of the variance of ~x, the results
provided in Proposition 1 can be seen as corresponding to the average situation in a model with
rational expectations and strategic behavior.
3.2 The model with two risky assets
The model is essentially the same as in Section 2 except that we now suppose that there are two
risky assets in the economy, whose associated payo¤s at the end of the period are respectively
denoted by ex and ey:We let p (resp. q) denote the price of ex (resp. ey) and we assume that ex and
ey are normally distributed, more precisely ex  N  ; 2 and ey  N  ;$2. We let  denote
the correlation between ex and ey; i.e.,   cov(ex;ey)$ : We also denote by ~M  ex + ey the market
portfolio payo¤s.
We assume that each guru can choose a belief, i.e. a pair (bi; bi) that maximizes his utility
from trade and as previously we look for an equilibrium with strategic beliefs manipulation. The
belief of agent i with respect to the average market portfolio payo¤ is denoted by bMi  bi+bi:
The denition and the notations are straightforward generalizations of those introduced in
Section 2.
Proposition 5 1. For given 1 and 2; there exists a unique equilibrium with strategic
beliefs manipulation ((bi; bi) ; i = 1; 2) where
bi(1;2) = + 12
 
122 + 

2
2
1 + 2

1

2
 1
i 12   12

1

212
i
 
2 + $

bi(1;2) =  + 1
2
 
122 + 

2
2
1 + 2

1

2
 1
i 12   12

1

212
i
 
$2 + $

and the associated average market portfolio payo¤s
bMi 
i=1;2
are given by
bMi (1;2) = M + 12
 
122 + 

2
2
1 + 2

1

2
 1
i 12   12

1

212
i
2
M
where 2M = $
2 + 2$ + 2:
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2. We have b1   b2b1   b2 = b1   b1    = 
2 + $
$2 + $
and beliefs dispersion is larger for the asset that has higher variance.
3. The equilibrium risk premia for the rst and the second asset as well as for the market
portfolio are given by
  p = 1
2
 
1

2  212  221

2

112
 
2 + $

;
   q = 1
2
 
1

2  212  221

2

112
 
$2 + $

;
M   (p+ q) = 1
2
 
1

2  212  221

2

112
2M :
4. There exists a unique equilibrium (1;2) for the groupsdynamics. It is given by Equa-
tion (7), as in the one asset framework.
5. If the gurus are on average as risk tolerant as the whole population, i.e.  = 

1+

2
2 ; then
1 > 2 and the market risk premium is increased
In fact, in the two assets framework everything works as in a one asset framework where
the unique asset is the market portfolio whose average payo¤ is given by M = +  and whose
variance is given by 2M = $
2 + 2$ + 2. This means that the more risk tolerant (risk
averse) group is pessimistic (resp. optimistic) at the aggregate level and the consensus belief is
pessimistic at the aggregate level. The formulas for individual assets that are provided in the
proposition are similar to those obtained in the one asset framework. However, for each asset,
the variance term in the one-asset formula is replaced by the covariance of the considered asset
payo¤s with the market portfolio payo¤s. Recall that in the Walrasian setting (CAPM setting),
the equilibrium price for a given asset depends on the covariance of the payo¤s of this asset
with the payo¤s of the market portfolio and not on the total variance of the asset payo¤s. Since
the gurus modify their beliefs in order to manipulate the prices, it is natural to obtain optimal
beliefs that depend on the covariance with the market portfolio and not on the total variance.
The aggregate level properties (pessimism, correlation between pessimism and risk tolerance,...)
are then retrieved at the individual assets level as far as these assets are positively correlated
with the market portfolio.
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It is interesting to note that these e¤ects are more pronounced for the riskier asset. Intu-
itively, since the gurus di¤er by their level of risk tolerance, more risk leads to more beliefs
dispersion and hence to a more pronounced impact on the market for the riskier asset.
3.3 The model with more than 2 gurus
We assumed so far that there are only 2 gurus in the economy. This is a natural assumption
when we only have one asset. Indeed, even if there are more than 2 gurus the condition that
all gurus have the same level of prediction accuracy or that all beliefs are at the same distance
of the objective belief implies that they will cluster in 2 groups with beliefs that are symmetric
with respect to the objective belief: an optimistic one and a pessimistic one. When there are
at least 2 assets, the situation is di¤erent. Let us illustrate this point in the 2 asset framework:
the condition that all gurus have beliefs (i; i) that are at the same distance of the objective
belief (; ) only imposes that all the (i; i) are on a same circle centered on (; ) :
In the next, we fully analyze the 2 asset and 3 guru framework.
With the same notations as above, solving for the Nash equilibrium leads to
i    =
1
2

12
2
3 + 13
2
2 + 23
2
1
123(12 +13 +23)
+
2
i
  1
12 +13 +23

i
 
2 + $

;
i    = 1
2

12
2
3 + 13
2
2 + 23
2
1
123(12 +13 +23)
+
2
i
  1
12 +13 +23

i
 
$2 + $

:
In particular, for i = 1; 2; 3; we have
i   
i    =
2 + $
$2 + $
and all the vectors (i   ; i   ) are then proportional. Imposing that all the gurus have the
same level of prediction accuracy (or that all beliefs are at the same distance of the objective
beliefs) leads then to a situation where at least two gurus have exactly the same beliefs. There-
fore, the 3 guru framework can be reduced to a 2 gurus framework. The same result can be
obtained for N gurus.
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4 Conclusion
When market opinions are driven by gurus and when these gurus act strategically, this leads to
heterogeneous and antagonistic beliefs. The agents cluster in two groups (even if there are more
than two gurus). The beliefs of the more risk averse group exhibit optimism while the beliefs of
the more risk tolerant group exhibit pessimism. As a consequence, there is a positive correlation
between pessimism and risk tolerance and the representative agent belief exhibits pessimism.
This induced pessimism of the representative agent is interesting in light of the risk premium
puzzle. It is interesting to notice that the di¤erent e¤ects we exhibit (beliefs heterogeneity,
representative agent pessimism, impact on the risk premium) are more pronounced for riskier
assets.
This work suggests further investigation. It would be useful to analyze how our results can
be transposed in a dynamic setting where agents then have dynamic strategies. We focused on
a steady state but it would be interesting to analyze how the gurus dynamically interact, how
their reputation evolves through time and how they converge to the steady state.
Appendix Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Guru 1 choses the belief b1 that maximizes
A1 (1) = 1
1   p(1; b2)
2
(  p(1; b2)) + p(1; b2)  12 11

1
1   p(1; b2)
2
2
2
where p(1; 2) =
11+22
1+2
  21+2 and where b2 is considered as given. Symmetrically, Guru
2 choses the belief b1 that maximizes
A2 (2) = 2
2   p(b1; 2)
2
(  p(b1; 2)) + 12p(b1; 2)  12 12

2
2   p(b1; 2)
2
2
2
where b1 is considered as given. Solving for dA1d1 (b1; b2) = dA2d2 (b1; b2) = 0 leads to Equations
(5) and (6).
Proof of Proposition 2
1. Let us assume that j1   j = j  2j : This leads to 1 = 2 or to 1    =   2.
There is no solution associated to 1 = 2: Indeed, using Equations (5) and (6), the condition
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1 = 2 leads to 2

1

2   112 + 212   221 = 0 or equivalently to 21 (2   1) + 1
(21   212) + 12   21 = 0: The discriminant associated to this polynomial equation
in 21 is given by 4

1

2 (

2  ) (1  ) which is negative.
Using Equations (5) and (6), the condition 1    =   2 is equivalent to
H(1)  231 (1   2)  321 (1   2) + 21 (  2) = 0:
We have H(0) = 21 (  2) > 0 and H() = 22(  1) < 0: It is easy to check that H
is decreasing on (0;) since H 0(1) = 61 (1  ) (1   2) is negative on this interval. The
equation H(1) = 0 admits then only one solution in (0;) :
2. In order analyze the stability of the equilibrium, let us analyze the signs of 1 ; 2 
and 1+2 2: It is easy to prove that the sign of 1+2 2 is the same as the sign of H(1);
the sign of 1  is the same as the sign of G(1) = 21 (1   2) 21 (1   2)+1 (  2)
and the sign of 2    is the same as the sign of K(1) =  21 (1   2) +1 (  2) : First,
under the assumption 1 >  > 

2; we already proved that H(0) > 0 and H() < 0 and that
H admits only one root on [0;]. Let us denote by H this root. Second, we prove that G has
only one root on [0;] : Indeed, the sum of its roots is equal to 2 and we have G(0) > 0 and
G() < 0: Let us denote by G this root. Third, we have K(0) > 0 and K() < 0 and it is
easy to see that K has a unique root on [0;] : Let us denote by K this root. We can easily
check that H(G) > 0 which gives us G < H : With similar arguments we can prove that
H < K : Finally, we can easily show that we always have 2 > 1:
We sum up these results in the following table where i is the symmetric of i with respect
to ; i.e. i = 2  i:

 
0;G
  
G;H
  
H ;K
  
K ;

G 1 >  1 <  1 <  1 < 
H 1 + 2 > 2 1 + 2 > 2 1 + 2 < 2 1 + 2 < 2
K 2 >  2 >  2 >  2 < 
(; 1; 2)  < 1 < 2 1 <  < 1 < 2 1 < 2 <  < 2 1 < 2 < 
_1 _1 > 0 _1 > 0 _1 < 0 _1 < 0
By denition, we have 1 = H : Consequently, we have _1 > 0 for 1 < 1 and _1 < 0
for 1 > 1:
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3. Let us consider the utility U i of an agent with risk tolerance level  that follows Guru i
and let us denote by j 6= i the other guru. We have
U i = exp
1

 
p (b1; b2) + i   p (b1; b2)2 (  p (b1; b2))  12 1


i   p (b1; b2)
2
2
2
!
= exp

p (b1; b2)

+
i   p (b1; b2)
2

1
2
  1
2
i  
1
2
p (b1; b2)
= exp

p (b1; b2)

+
i   p (b1; b2)
2

1 + 2
2
  1
2
i  
1
2
p (b1; b2)
= exp

p (b1; b2)

+
1
22
(i   p (b1; b2))  j   p (b1; b2) :
We then have U i = U
j
 and the utility level does not depend on the choice of a specic guru.
4. Let us now assume that  = 

1+

2
2 . Under this assumption we obtain H(
1+

2
4 ) < 0 and
H(
1+

2
2 ) > 0 which implies that 

1 2

1+

2
4 ;
1+

2
2

and 2 2

0;
1+

2
4

: In particular, we
have 1 > 2. Let us prove that Group 1 is more pessimistic than Group 2 or equivalently
that b1    < 0: We have then to prove that G  H < 0: This results directly from the table
above: Group 1 and Guru 1 are then more pessimistic then Group 2 and Guru 2. Pessimism
and risk tolerance are then positively correlated at the gurus level.
5. If the two groups are of equal size, the average belief is then the objective belief. The
average risk tolerance in Group 1 (resp. Group 2) is then equal to 21 (resp. 22) and the
covariance between optimism and risk tolerance is then given by (1  2) (b1   ) < 0:
Proof of Proposition 3 When Guru 1 has an initial belief 1 and Guru 2 has an initial belief
2; they announce beliefs (b1; b2) such that b1 maximizes
A1 (1; b2) = 11   p(1; b2)2 (1   p(1; b2)) + p(1; b2)  12 11

1
1   p(1; b2)
2
2
2
the belief b2 being given and such that b2 maximizes
A2 (b1; 2) = 22   p(b1; 2)2 (2   p(b1; 2)) + p(b1; 2)  12 12

2
2   p(b1; 2)
2
2
2
the belief b1 being given and where p(1; 2) = 11+22   2 (market clearing condition).
The rst order conditions dA1d1 (b1; b2) = dA2d2 (b1; b2) = 0 can be rewritten as follows
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b1 = 112b2 + 1121 + 212 + 1221 + 221   2112112 + 122
b2 = 212b1 + 2122   222 + 212 + 2212 + 2222212 + 221
and solving this system for (b1; b2) gives the result.
Proof of Proposition 4 It su¢ ces to check that ((b1 (y1; y2) ; b2 (y1; y2) ; P (y1; y2)) is a rational
expectation equilibrium with strategic beliefs manipulation. Remark that P (y1; y2) satisfes the
condition P (y1; y2) =
1b1(y1;y2)+2b1(y1;y2)
   
2
 and P (y1; y2) is then the equilibrium price
when Guru 1 announces b1 (y1; y2) and Guru 2 announces b2 (y1; y2) : Since P (y1; y2) reveals
y1+y2
2 and since
y1+y2
2 is a su¢ cient statistics of all available information, everything works as
if each agent would take expectations that are conditional to y1+y22 : They would share then the
same belief N  ; 2 with  =  + (y   ) 21
2
2"+
2 and 
2 = 
22"
2"+2
2 : Their announced beliefs
would then be determined by Equations (5) and (6) replacing (; 2) by
 
; 2

.
Proof of Proposition 5When there are 2 assets and when Guru 1 announces (1; 1) and Guru
2 announces (2; 2) the optimal demands of Group i in asset 1 and in asset 2 are respectively
given by
Gi = i
i   p
2 (1  2)  i
(i   q) 
$ (1  2)
Gi = i
i   q
$2 (1  2)  i
(i   p) 
$ (1  2)
and by the market clearing condition, the equilibrium prices are given by
p =
11 +22

  
2 + $

; q =
11 +22

  $
2 + $

:
The optimal demands i and i of Guru i in asset 1 and in asset 2 are respectively given by
i = 

i
1   p
2 (1  2)   

i
(1   q) 
$ (1  2) ;
i = 

i
1   q
$2 (1  2)   

i
(1   p) 
$ (1  2) :
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Guru i maximizes then
Ai = p+ i (  p) + q + i (   q) 
1
2
1
i
 
2i
2 + 2i$
2 + 2ii$

with respect to (i; i) the belief of the other guru being given. The rst order conditions
dA1
d1
= dA1d1 =
dA2
d2
= dA2d2 = 0 can be rewritten as follows
1 =
$12   $11 + 112 + 1122 + $21   211 + 122 + 212 + 221
(21 +2)21
;
1 =
$12   $11 + 112 + 1122 + $21  $211 +$212 + 122 +$221
(21 +2)21
;
2 =
$12   $22 + 212 + 2121 + $22   222 + 221 + 212 + 222
(22 +1)12
;
2 =
$12   $22 + 212 + 2121 + $22  $222 +$212 + 221 +$222
(22 +1)12
:
Solving for (i; i) gives 1. and 2. and 3.
Since we have 1 1  =
2 
2  ; the condition (1   )
2+(1   )2 = (2   )2+(2   )2 can
be rewritten as follows
j1   j = j2   j
leading to the same equations as in Proposition 2. This proves 4. and 5.
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